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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Domestic Relations-Effect of Community Property Laws on
Interpretation of "Gross Income" in North Carolina Alimony
Without Divorce Award
In the recent case of Kinross-Wright v. Kinross-Wright,1 the North
Carolina Supreme Court was asked to interpret for the first time the
term "gross income" as used in an alimony judgment. Plaintiff, a
resident of North Carolina, had been granted an alimony without
divorce award2 to be paid by defendant, at that time a resident of Texas.
The award provided that defendant was to pay $350 or 30% of his
gross income, whichever was greater, to plaintiff each month for the
support and maintenance of herself and their two children. Defendant
was ordered to forward to plaintiff an authenticated copy of his federal
income tax return for each taxable year thereafter. It was further pro-
vided that if defendant's gross income "'as shown on said tax return"3
exceeded the sum of $14,000, a sum equal to 30%o of the excess over
$14,000 divided by 12 was to be added to each monthly payment due
plaintiff and children for the next twelve months. Two months after
the alimony award, plaintiff was granted an absolute divorce on
grounds of two years separation, without prejudice to the prior alimony
award. Almost immediately thereafter, defendant remarried and con-
tinued to live in Texas with his second wife. Defendant later filed a
petition for modification and clarification of the alimony judgment.
Plaintiff then filed a petition alleging that defendant's gross income had
exceeded $14,000 and that he had failed to pay her 30% of the excess
as ordered. Defendant contended that the term "gross income" as used
in the alimony judgment did not include income which, under the
Texas community property laws,5 was the income and property of his
second wife. It was this dispute, inter alia, which the North Carolina
court was asked to decide.
'248 N.C. 1, 102 S.E.2d 469 (1958).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1957).
248 N.C. at 3, 102 S.E.2d at 470. (Emphasis added.)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1957), which provides in effect that a prior
alimony award will be terminated by a subsequent absolute divorce obtained by
the wife on the ground of separation for the statutory period (two years), was not
applicable here since the alimony award was obtained in 1953 and the amendment
did not become effective until January 1, 1956. See Yow v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79,
89 S.E.2d 867 (1955) ; Rayfield v. Rayfield, 242 N.C. 691, 89 S.E.2d 399 (1955).
'TEX. CoNsT. ANN. art. 16 § 15; TEX. RF-v. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4613-14,
4619 (1951).
"The community property system has lived since the days of the rude tribes of
Germany when the wives who shared the fighting were thought to be worthy of a
share in the spoils. When Germanic Goths conquered and occupied Spain they
carried the concept of community property with them to that nation, and one of
the Gothic rulers of Spain, by statute, made community of matrimonial gains the
general law of Spain. Spain, in turn, introduced the community property to the
new world, and by this manner it became part of the law of Texas." TEX. CONST.
ANN. art. 16, § 15, Interpretive Commentary at 102.
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It is well settled under Texas law that a married person's legal gross
income consists of only one-half of the total amount which he produces.0
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to give this mean-
ing to the term "gross income," and instead concluded that the term as
used in the alimony judgment meant gross income as interpreted under
the North Carolina law. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied
entirely on two cases from other jurisdictions-Alexander v. Alexander,7
and Arthur v. Arthur.8  These involved the construction of the terms
"gross income" and "gross earnings," respectively, as used in separation
agreements.9
In Alexander, the defendant was required by a separation agree-
ment, approved by a divorce decree, to furnish a true and certified copy
of his federal income tax return, and "if, as shown thereby or otherwise
established, the defendant should have gross income [in excess of a
specified amount] from whatever source derived [then the defendant
was to pay a percentage of the excess to the plaintiff] . . . ."10 The
agreement had been executed in Missouri, a non-community property
jurisdiction. Defendant thereafter remarried, moved to Texas, and then
claimed that his gross income should be reduced by one-half in com-
puting the amount due under the contract. It was held, under the
particular circumstances, that the Texas law could not be invoked so
as to reduce the payments.
In Arthur, the California court was called upon to interpret a
separation contract, executed in New York, which provided that the
defendant was to pay a certain percentage of his "gross earnings" to the
plaintiff. Defendant later remarried and moved to the community
property state of California."l It was apparent that the contract had
not been executed in contemplation of defendant's future marriage, much
less in contemplation of the possibility that defendant might subsequent-
ly move to a community property jurisdiction.'2 Further, no criterion
I The community property system is specifically recognized in the Texas
Constitution and is set out in detail in the statutes of that state. These statutes
clearly provide that any earnings of either husband or wife become community
income, and that the wife's interest is equal to the husband's. Her interest in the
community is properly characterized as a present vested interest equal and equiva-
lent to that of her husband; one-half of the community income is therefore income
of the wife. See TEx. CoNsT. ANN. art. 16 § 15; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
4613-14, 4619 (1951). See also Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) ; Wright
v. Hays' Adm'r, 10 Tex. 130 (1848).
764 F. Supp. 123 (1945), aff'd, 158 F.2d 429 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
845 (1947).
8147 Cal. App. 2d 252, 305 P.2d 171 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
o These are apparently the only reported cases in the United States which even
remotely involve the Kinross-Wright situation.
" 64 F. Supp. at 125. (Emphasis added.)
21 "In Louisiana, Texas, California, Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada,
and Washington, what is known as the 'community system of matrimonial gains'
prevails." TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 294 (new abr. ed. 1940).
" 147 Cal. App. 2d at-, 305 P.2d at 174.
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was set forth in the contract whereby the meaning of "gross earnings"
might be ascertained. With these factors in mind, the court held that
"the word 'earnings' is used to indicate the amount produced, not that
part only which may vest in defendant by virtue of the community
property law."'13
There are important distinctions between the Alexander and Arthur
cases and the Kinross-Wright case. In the principal case, the judgment
of the lower court expressly stated that the plaintiff's right to any in-
crease in the amount of alimony being paid to her was to be determined
by the amount of defendant's gross income "as shown on said tax return
for the preceding year." There was nothing in the judgment which in-
dicated that defendant's gross income was to be determined solely under
North Carolina law. That the court meant defendant's gross income
as shown on his tax return, whether it be determined under the laws of
North Carolina, Texas, or some other state to which defendant might
become subject, is the only interpretation to which the clear and simple
language used by the lower court lends itself.
It is true that in the Alexander case the defendant was required to
furnish plaintiff a copy of his tax return; however, the contract there
clearly did not limit the amount of gross income to that amount as shown
on the tax return. On the contrary, it was expressly provided that
gross income might be "otherwise established." Under this broad lan-
guage, together with the surrounding circumstances, the federal court
was justified in ruling as it did.
Further, both the Alexander and Arthur cases involved contracts
made and intended to be executed in states which did not have a com-
munity property system, and by parties, all of whom were residents of
such states at that time. In neither case was it contemplated that the
defendant would remarry and subsequently move to a community prop-
erty state. In the principal case, however, defendant was already resid-
ing in Texas and had become subject to its community property laws
at the time the final alimony judgment was rendered.' 4 The record
further indicates that the Kinross-Wright alimony suit was brought by
plaintiff in contemplation of a subsequent absolute divorce from de-
21 Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated: "[S]o far as plaintiff is
concerned, his contracting a marriage with another woman thereafter and his
removal to the State of California where such other woman had a vested interest
in half of his earnings as community property are no different in effect than his
execution of an assignment of one-half of such earnings to some finance company
in consideration of a loan"' Ibid.
" The original summons was issued February 13, 1952, at which time both
plaintiff and defendant were residents of North Carolina. On March 5, 1952, an
interlocutory order for subsistence and counsel fees was entered. In January of
1953, defendant moved his residence from North Carolina to Texas; therefore,
when the cause came on for final hearing on September 3, 1953, and the final
alimony decree was entered, defendant .d been a legal resident of Texas for
approximately nine months.
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fendant; and that their marital difficulties had arisen from de-
fendant's prolonged association with the woman whom he married
within a month after the date of the absolute divorce. Thus, the parties
must have known at the time of the alimony award that defendant in-
tended to remarry and reside in Texas with his second wife after the
absolute divorce was granted. It appears, then, that all parties must
have contemplated that defendant's gross income as shown on his tax
return would be determined under the Texas law rather than the North
Carolina law, so long as defendant filed his income tax return as a
resident of that state.
A careful reading of the Alexander and Arthur cases reveals that
the court in each case reached its decision by applying the general rules
of construction applicable to written instruments. The Alexander case
plainly states: "[T]he question posed turns upon an interpretation of
the phrase 'gross income' as the parties understood and used that term
when they executed the contract."'I5 In the principal case, the court was
construing a judgment; but the rules of construction of written instru-
ments also apply to the construction of judgments.'8 A judgment must
be construed in the light of the situation of the court, 17 what the court
had before it,' 8 and the accompanying circumstances.' 9
If the North Carolina court had given effect to the apparent intention
of the parties, based upon the surrounding circumstances, and to the
plain language of the judgment, the term "gross income" might well
have been construed in accordance with the operation of the Texas
community property law. However, the court makes no mention of in-
tention of the parties, and in following the holdings of the Alexander
and Arthur cases states: "The reasoning in these two cases ... appears
to be sound, and may well be applied with approval to the factual situa-
tion in the instant case."'20 It is not certain whether the basis of the
present decision is (1) that the court found the actual intent of the
parties to be that North Carolina law was to control, notwithstanding
13 158 F.2d at 430.
'6 Decker v. Tyree, 204 Ky. 302, 264 S.W. 726 (1924); Perman Oil Co. v.
Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 107 S.W.2d 564 (1937).
"' Rinaldo v. Board of Medical Examiners, 123 Cal. App. 712, 12 P.2d 32
(Dist. Ct. App. 1932); cf. Bank of Union v. Redwine, 171 N.C. 559, 88 S.E. 878
(1916).
1 Toms v. Holmes, 294 Ky. 233, 171 S.W.2d 245 (1943). The court's
province is to construe contracts, not to make contracts for the parties, and neither
court nor jury may disregard contracts expressed in plain terms and unambiguous
language. See Belk's Dep't Store v. George Washington Fire Ins. Co., 208
N.C. 267, 180 S.E. 63 (1935) ; King v. Davis, 190 N.C. 737, 130 S.E. 707 (1925).
1" Christiano v. Christiano, 131 Conn. 589, 41 A.2d 779 (1945). In construing
a writing in order to determine the true intent of the parties, the following should
be considered: the subject matter, the situation of the parties, and the circum-
stances at the time -when the writing was executed. See Bank of Union v.
Redwine, 171 N.C. 559, 88 S.E. 878 (1916).20 248 N.C. at 12, 102 S.E.2d at 477.
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the apparent intention of the parties, or (2) that, as a matter of public
policy, where it is not otherwise clearly expressed to the contrary, an
alimony award will not be diminished by the defendant's subsequent
remarriage in a community property state.
It is submitted that the decision seems sound from the standpoint
of public policy. Since the prime purpose of an alimony award is to
provide support for a defendant's wronged wife and family, he should
not, by the simple expedient of remarrying in a state where community
property laws obtain, be allowed thereby to divest his first wife and
family of a large part of their support.
Many variations of the Kinross-Wright situation might arise in the
future. If the Kinross-Wright decision be considered as a judicial
expression of public policy, it seems likely that the North Carolina
court, in interpreting the term "gross income" in separation contracts or
alimony judgments, will continue to disregard the community property
laws of other states, absent a specific provision to the contrary.
ROBERT C. SOLES, JR.
Husband and Wife-Tenancy by the Entirety-Surviving Spouse's
Right to Contribution on Paying Debt Secured by Mortgage on
Entireties Property
H and W hold a house and lot as tenants by the entireties.1 The
property has a market value of $20,000. Part of this value is due to
recent improvements on the property, for which H and W jointly ex-
ecuted notes and a mortgage. H dies when there is still $8,000 owing.
W succeeds to the entire fee and petitions H's executors for $4,000,
claiming that amount as H's share of the joint debt. Under these facts,
the Supreme Court of Delaware recently held in In re Keil's Estate,
2
that the claim should be allowed.
The recovery was allowed on the principle of equitable contribution.
The rationale of the principle is that where parties are under a common
burden or liability, one joint debtor who pays the whole debt, or more
than his share, is entitled, in equity, to contribution from his co-obligors.
3
"' Estates by the entireties are creatures of the common law created by legal
fiction and based wholly on the common-law doctrine that husband and wife are
one, and, therefore there is but one estate, and in contemplation of law, but one
person owning the whole .... By reason of their legal unity by marriage, the
husband and wife together take the whole estate as one person. Neither has a
separate estate or interest in the land, but each has the whole estate. Upon the
death of one the entire estate and interest belongs to the other, not by virtue of
survivorship, but by virtue of the title that vested under the original limitation.'"
Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 493, 94 S.E.2d 466, 469 (1956), quoting 4
THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1803 (perm. ed. 1940).
'-Del.-, 145 A.2d 563 (1958).
* 13 At. Jua., Contribution § 3 (1938).
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